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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Such legislative action was attempted, but proved to be unsuc-
cessful. On February 18, 1948, a bill 46 was introduced in the New
York Assembly, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:
§ 59. Negligence and contributory negligence of operator other, than owner
attributable to owner. Every owner of a motor vehicle... operated upon a
public highway shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person
or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor
vehicle . . . , in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person
legally using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied,
of such owner. The contributory negligence of any person legally using or
operating a motor vehicle . . . , with the permission of the owner express or
implied, in the business of such owner or otherwise shall be imputable to such
owner.
After its introduction, the proposal was referred to committee,
from which it was never reported out. To pigeonhole such a cor-
rective measure is to perpetuate New York's adherence to a basically
unsound rule. Other jurisdictions have taken the initiative, so far
as similar statutes were concerned, and it remains to be seen for
how long a period New York will be content to lag behind. It is
submitted that "By amending the Vehicle and Traffic Law so that
the negligence of the driver will be imputed to the owner in all cases
where the vehicle is used with his consent, express or implied, the
legislature may achieve a result that is uniformly just." 4I
THE "Now oR HEREAFTER ACQUIRED PERSONAL PROPERTY" CLAUSE
Introduction
Nowhere in the New York Law of Mortgages is "judicial sur-
gery" and accurate statutory draftsmanship more needed than in
that aspect of the law which treats of "personalty" clauses in real
property mortgages. Hindered by loose language,' stare decisis,2
4 61948 Sess. Int. 2260, Pr. No. 2414, introduced by Assemblyman Samuel
Roman. At the same time, Senator Seymour Halpern introduced a similar
bill in the New York Senate, 1948 Sess. Int. 1910, Pr. No. 2092.
47Note, 16 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 222, 230 (1942).1 See note 26 infra.
21n a speech made before the New York State Bar Association, Judge
Cardozo said: ". . . bearing in mind the fact that sellers of the ranges under
contracts of conditional sale had made their sales in the faith that the ranges
were personalty merely, and had refrained from taking measures to protect
themselves by recording their bills of sale in ways that would have been ap-
propriate if they had supposed that the ranges were annexations to the land
S.. a majority of the court believed that in view of the probable reliance by
innocent parties upon a decision which the same majority would have refused
to make if the question had been a new one, there was nothing to do except
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and the law's refusal to keep abreast of social 3 and financial 4 con-
ditions, the mortgagee finds himself in the anomalous position of
lending money upon security which, through no fault of his own, will
not fall within the purview of his lien. To fully develop this problem,
a treatment of the common law of fixtures,u the "Now and Hereafter
Acquired Personal Property clause," and the effect of various "ex-
clusionary" 6 and recording statutory provisions, is essential.
The Common Law of Fixtures
A fixture,7 as the term is commonly used, refers to "a chattel
annexed to land in a permanent way so that it has lost its character
as a movable thing and has become permanently identified with the
land to which it is attached as a part of it... provided it still retains
its identity as a distinct thing, apart from the land." 8 The fixture
is distinguished from a chattel that remains personal property as a
matter of law 9 in that the former has been actually annexed to and
is adaptable to use in connection with the freehold, and that there
was an intention to make the same a permanent accession to the free-
to adhere to what its predecessors had done, and let stare decisis control the
judgment." Cardozo, The Stare Decisis of the Future, 55 N. Y. S. B. A. REP.
293, 296 (1932).
3"But there comes a time when the law must keep abreast of the changes
in social conditions; when we as judges must recognize the circumstances under
which the business of housing is now conducted." Judge Crane, dissenting in
Madfes v. Beverly Development Corp. et al., 251 N. Y. 12, 21, 166 N. E. 787,
790 (1929).
4 ". . . the after-acquired property clause is designed to promote produc-
tive enterprise by providing security for credit expansion." Cohen and Gerber,
The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. or PA. L. REv. 635, 649 (1939).
' "The rule of determination here is the law as laid down by the courts
of the state of New York. No statute defines fixtures as distinguished from
personal property. We must look to the decisions of the courts of New York
as to what are fixtures as distinguished from personal property to guide our
conclusion." In re Walker Bin Co., 9 F. Supp. 367, 368 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
6See textual treatment infra dealing with the effect of Sections 65, 67 of
the New York Personal Property Law upon after-acquired clauses.
7 A fixture as discussed in this article will be limited to the fixture con-
cept as it affects the mortgagor-mortgagee and the vendor-vendee relation-
ships; for as to landlord-tenant, life tenant-remainderman, and heir-personal
representative relationships, different rules prevail. For an excellent study of
these differences, see Friedman, The Scope of Mortgage Liens on Fixtures
and Personal Property in New York, 7 FORD. L. Rxv. 331, 338, n. 46 (1938).8 WALsH, THE LAW oF REAL PROPERTY § 37 (2d ed. 1937).
9 Madfes v. Beverly Development Corp. et aL, 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E.
787 (1929) (gas ranges); Chasnov v. Marlane Holding Co., 137 Misc. 332,
244 N. Y. Supp. 455 (N. Y. Munic. Ct 1930) (electric refrigerators); Kel-
vinator Sales Corp. v. Byro Realty Corp. et al., 136 Misc. 720, 241 N. Y.
Supp. 632 (N. Y. City Ct 1930), affd, 233 App. Div. 653, 249 N. Y. Supp.
910 (1st Dep't 1931) ; New York Title and Mortgage Co. v. Grossman Prop-
erties, 142 Misc. 274, 253 N. Y. Supp. 533 (Sup. Ct. 1931), affd, 236 App.
Div. 665, 257 N. Y. Supp. 1031, 1032 (lst Dep't 1932) (gas ranges and elec-
tric light fixtures).
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hold.10 By retaining its distinct identity, when affixed, the fixture
will not become an integral and indistinguishable part of the realty.11
Building materials such as lumber, brick, and stone which, when
affixed, so merge with the land as to lose their identity as distinct
things, regardless of the parties' intention, become realty by the
doctrine of accession.1 2  Those articles which become realty as a
matter of law through application of this doctrine present little or no
problem to attorneys or business men, since no clause covering such
personal property is needed: upon annexation to the realty they, ipso
facto, "feed" the real property mortgage.'"
Although courts, in determining whether a chattel is a fixture,
are still disposed to require actual attachment and an immovable
character of articles brought upon and used in conjunction with the
freehold, today, due to the type of article '4 and the nature of the
premises 15 wherein the personalty will be used, judges, as a substitute
for actual attachment, will seek the "object for and not the method
of attachment" 1 in attributing "an immovable character to a mov-
able object." 1T Thus, by the fiction of "constructive annexation" 18
what was once regarded as personal property as a matter of law is
now, without protest, a fixture of the land.
Once having found an attachment either as a result of actual
or "constructive annexation," we must then find the article's perman-
ency and adaptability for use with the land.' 9 It is the intent of the
10 Teaff v. Hewitt et al., 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853) (leading case) ; Walker v.
Sherman, 20 Wend. 636, 651-653 (N. Y. 1839) accord, McRea v. Central
Nat. Bank of Troy et al., 66 N. Y. 489, 495 (186) ; Potter v. Cromwell, 40
N. Y. 287 (1869).
"See East New York Electric Co. v. Petmaland Realty Co. et al., 243
N. Y. 477, 480-481, 154 N. E. 530, 531 (1926); De Bevoise et al. v. Maple
Ave. Const. Co. et al., 228 N. Y. 496, 500, 127 N. E. 487, 489 (1920); Davis
et al. v. Bliss, 187 N. Y. 77, 83, 79 N. E. 851, 853 (1907); Ford v. Cobb
et al., 20 N. Y. 344, 350-351 (1859).12 Cases cited note 11 supra.
13Guaranty Trust Co. v. N. Y. & Q. C. Ry. et al., 253 N. Y. 190, 199, 170
N. E. 887, 890 (1930).
14 In cases involving the use of heavy machinery in factories and plants,
the courts have been liberal in describing unattached property as fixtures.
See McRea v. Cent. Nat. Bank of Troy et al., 66 N. Y. 489, 495 (1876)(machines in paper mill); Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287 (1869) (grist
mill); WALSH, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTy § 44 (2d ed. 1937), and cases
cited therein.
15 Articles which are designed to fit a particular home or building, though
detached, are considered realty for they go towards the completion of the
building. Their adaptability for permanent use as part of the house shows
conclusively the intent to make them fixtures. See WALSH, op. cit. smpra
note 14, § 45.16 Friedman, supra note 7, at 333.
1 7bid.
'1sBuPY, H xDBoOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PaoPmrv § 20 (1943) ; WALsH,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 40, 41 (2d ed. 1937).
'1Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853); BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY§137 (1936); BuRBY, op. cit. supra note 18, §20; Holmes, Classification of
Fixtures for Assessment, 29 CALIF. L. Rv. 21, 27 (1929).
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parties which, at this point, is of prime importance: not the secret,
unexpressed intent of the owner, but rather ". . . that the average
man under the same circumstances would have intended to annex
the chattel as a permanent accession to the freehold . *.".." 20 The
mere declaration of the owner that he intends that they shall go with
the house does not make them realty. If we, by applying the above
tests, can find that the personalty annexed to the real property is
a fixture, it would fall within the control of the realty mortgage
without the need of a personalty clause. However, some courts, for
some inexplicable reason, or when obligated to that overly demand-
ing mistress, stare decisis, have not been disposed to utilize this test
when dealing with certain articles found upon the realty. In Central
Union Gas Co. v. Browning,2 1 while determining whether gas ranges
were included as part of the premises in a foreclosure sale, the court
stated that ". . .these ranges were not so 'attached' to the building
that, as a matter of law, they became part of it.... This is not such
an attachment to the building as would give a mortgagee any right
of ownership as against his mortgagor, and we do not see how a
purchaser at a foreclosure sale could acquire any greater right. We
think that these ranges situated as they were, lost none of their
characteristics as personal property." 22 Chasnov v. Marlane Hold-
ing Co.2 3 held electric refrigerators to be personalty as a matter of
law without applying the before mentioned rules of construction, and
in Madfes v. Beverly Development Corp. et al.2 4 the court reiterated
that a gas range (which obviously is a fixture) is personalty as a mat-
ter of law, so as to protect innocent parties who had relied upon
past decisions. Despite the fact that more than twenty-five years
had passed since gas ranges had first been declared personal prop-
erty,2Z at a time when it was not common practice for landlords to
fully equip kitchens with stoves, refrigerators, and sinks, as is the
practice today, the Court of Appeals, through Judge Kellogg, stated
that such a change must emanate from the legislature.2 6
2 0 WALSH, THE LAW OF REAL. PROPERTY § 42 (2d ed. 1937).
21210 N. Y. 10, 103 N. E. 822 (1913).
22 Central Union Gas Co. v. Browning, 210 N. Y. 10-13, 103 N. E. 822-
823 (1913).
23 137 Mlisc. 332, 244 N. Y. Supp. 455 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1930).
24251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929).2 5 Cosgrove v. Troescher, 62 App. Div. 123, 70 N. Y. Supp. 764 (1st Dep't
1901).
26 The trenchant comments of a law review writer, twenty-two years prior to
the Madfes decision, supra note 24, are still apropos: "There is no branch of
the common law against which the charge of incoherency has been laid more
frequently than it has against that involving questions of rights in 'fixtures.'...
There are some parts of our law that have been particularly favored dumping
grounds for loose, inaccurate legal phraseology, careless definition of legal
issues, artificial generalizations, and other such debris which in the course of the
years have obscured the real criteria of judicial decisions and have unnecessarily
rendered the law difficult of apprehension. The law of 'fixtures' has been
one of these dumping grounds." Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning the
Law of Fixtures, 7 COL. L. REv. 1 (1907).
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With such precedents existing, the draftsmen of a mortgage
can hardly rely upon the principles of accession or fixtures to create
sufficient security. Thus, a personal property clause is currently
used whenever it is desired that personalty now or hereafter acquired
is or shall be subject to the lien of the mortgage.
The Personal Property Clause
The personal property clause as it is found in real property
mortgages is, generally, one of two types. The first is a duplica-
tion of the clause found within Section 254 of the Real Property Law
which reads as follows: "Together with the appurtenances, and all
the estate and rights of the party of the first part in and to said
premises, together with all fixtures and articles of personal property
attached to, or used in connection with, the premises." The second,
and more common variety, is an enlargerfhent of the statutory form
and covers articles not only presently attached to the fee, but, also
those articles annexed after execution, delivery, and recordation
of the mortgage. To be certain that these clauses will cover cases
of personal property not attached to the freehold, or which, though
attached to the realty, are personalty as a matter of law [as has been
previously discussed], the phrase "used in connection with the free-
hold" has been inserted. Chattels which, when used in conjunction
with the realty, reveal an "organic unity" 27 with the realty, for ex-
ample, rugs, furniture, appliances, etc., are encompassed by this
phrase.
A legal mortgage operates in praesenti, and conveys only the
then-existing property mentioned therein.28 Therefore, a lien upon
non-existent things, being impossible at law, is equitable in nature3
Equity acting upon the mortgagor's conscience and considering "....
that which ought to be done as done," 30 construes ". . . the instru-
ment as operating by way of present contract, to give a lien, which,
as between the parties, takes effect and attaches to the subject of it
as soon as it comes into the ownership of the party." 31 This cov-
enant or contract to give a lien does not run with the land but rather,
2 7 Friedman, supra note 7, at 347.
28 There is an exception to this rule. As to crops not yet grown or as to
the increase of animals not yet in esse, title may be passed by a grant or con-
tract of sale made in advance of the physical existence of the subject of grant
or sale. See BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 159 (1936). Under Section
86 of the New York Personal Property Law it is provided that when the
parties purport to effect a present sale of future goods the agreement operates
as a contract to sell goods. By express provision the act excludes mortgages,
so that today an effective legal mortgage on these potential goods may be
made in New York.
29 Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" & New York, 20 CoL. L. Rnv. 519,
525 (1920).30 Cohen and Gerber, supra note 4. at 646.
s1 Kribbs v. Alford et al., 120 N. Y. 519, 524, 24 N. E. 811, 812 (1890).
[VaOL. 25
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in the absence of an assumption by a grantee of the mortgaged prem-
ises, is personal to the obligor.32 Equity may refuse, however, to
utilize this fiction where interests of third persons are involved for
these persons may have relied upon what would prove to be false
security if this equitable lien is effectuated. In Rochester Distilling
Co. v. Rasey33 the court, discussing an after-acquired clause in a
chattel mortgage stated: "Such provisions seem ... to exclude the
idea... that such an instrument could operate to defeat the lien of
an attaching, or an execution creditor upon subsequently acquired
property." "I
These clauses, certainly clear and unambiguous upon their faces,
ofttimes have not been given their just due. In many cases this
is attributable to a reluctance by the court to control a man's future
property for the sake of present credit. "There is little if any, ques-
tion but that the personal property clause covers, generally, such
attached articles as are subsequently installed by the mortgagor though
not of such nature as would be deemed to be a part of the realty." 85
However, its coverage of unattached articles used in conjunction with
the realty has perplexed jurists, and has not been uniformly resolved.
In Ex parte Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Brooklyn
Lodge No. 22 36 the circuit court in applying New York law found
that "Under settled interpretation, the words, 'used in connection
with the premises,' add nothing. They relate to chattels attached to
the realty, and do not include those unattached which are merely em-
ployed in the business conducted thereon." 37 So too, in Manufac-
turers Trust Co. v. Peck-Schwartz Realty Corp. et al.38 it was stated
that "The words contained in the statutory form [the personal prop-
erty clause] do not necessarily bring within the coverage of the
mortgage movables which are not so attached to the realty as to
become fixtures." 89
Contrasting these unqualified refusals to give effect to the per-
sonal property clause, per se, are Shelton Holding Corporation v.
150 East 48th Street Corporation et al.40 In re Downtown Athletic
32 New York Trust Co. et at. v. Bull, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 182, 184 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
33 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632 (1894).3
" Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 579, 37 N. E. 632,
634 (1894). But cf. Kribbs v. Alford et al., 120 N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 811
(1890) (an equitable mortgage of chattels, including a mortgage of after-
acquired chattels, is valid and enforceable against purchasers from the mort-
gagor with notice and when recorded, the record is constructive notice to
purchasers).
35 Friedman, supra note 7, at 345, n. 76, and cases cited therein.
3 69 F. 2d 816 (2d Cir. 1934).
37 Id. at 818.
38 277 N. Y. 283, 14 N. E. 2d 70 (1938).
39 Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Peck-Schwartz Realty Corp. et al., 277 N. Y.
283, 286, 14 N. E. 2d 70, 71 (1938).do264 N. Y. 339, 191 N. E. 8 (1934).
1951]
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Club of New York City, Inc.,41 and General Synod of Reformed
Church v. Bonac R. Corp. et al. 42 In the Shelton case, a prior realty
mortgagee, whose mortgage contained the after-acquired clause, act-
ing to forestall an attempt to remove kitchenette equipment by a
subsequent chattel mortgagee, brought an action praying that the
chattel mortgage be cancelled of record, and that enforcement of the
chattel mortgage be enjoined. The court directed judgment in favor
of the plaintiff in accordance with the prayer of the complaint, since
"The only fair inference under these circumstances is that the parties
intended . .. to install the kitchenette equipment as part of ... the
apartment hotel .... ,,43 By giving the words ".... an effect cor-
responding to . . . [their] plain sense . . . " the federal district
court in the Downtown Athletic Club case held that a building loan
mortgage covered the furnishings not affixed to the building.44 In
distinguishing the Peck-Schwartz holding from the issue before him
in the Bonac case, Judge Desmond remarked: "The argument that,
absent such proof and such a finding, there is no coverage of such
articles, even when there is an 'after-acquired property' clause in the
mortgage, is based... on statements in the opinion in Manufacturers
Trust Co. v. Peck-Schwartz Realty Corp ..... .If the statement in
the opinion as to the fourth requirement is read to mean that there
must be affirmative clear and unequivocal proof, apart from the mort-
gage itself, that the parties in fact intended to have the mortgage
cover these appliances, then plaintiff failed to prove its case, for there
is no such separate showing of intent in this record. But we do not
read Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Peck-Schwartz Realty Corp ...
as insisting on such additional evidence, in every case. In that case,
... there was much to suggest that the parties to the mortgage never
in fact considered the furnishings covered; and there was no finding,
one way or the other, as to their intent. In the present case the
Trial Justice had before him only the mortgage covenant, which in
clear and nontechnical language put the movables, presently in the
house or thereafter to be acquired, under the lien. Appellant bought
the building subject to that same mortgage, and, charged with knowl-
edge of the after-acquired personalty clause, bought and installed
new appliances. With such proof, and nothing else, before him, the
Trial Justice here properly found that the refrigerators, ranges, and
showers 'are covered by the consolidated mortgage.' We read that
as an affirmative and sufficient finding of intent." 45 In 'commenting
upon the Bonac holding it has been asserted that: "The ruling of
4118 F. Supp. 712 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
42297 N. Y. 119, 75 N. E. 2d 841 (1947).
43 Shelton Holding Corporation v. 150 East 48th Street Corporation et al.,
264 N. Y. 339, 347, 191 N. E. 8, 11 (1934).44 In re Downtown Athletic Club of New York City, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 712,
715 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
45 General Synod of Reformed Church v. Bonac Realty Corp. et al., 297
N. Y. 119, 123-124, 75 N. E. 2d 841, 842 (1947).
[ VOL. 25
NOTES AND COMMENT
the New York Court of Appeals ... [that case] goes far towards
removal of the former uncertainties and marks a stride toward re-
establishment of the plain, and on principle the obvious, proposition
that, granting the validity of such clauses, their construction is only
a matter of getting at the intention of the parties as disclosed by the
instrument itself, absent ambiguity." 46
The Personal Property Clause and the Recording Statutes
The protection afforded the mortgagee, who incorporates such
a clause within his realty mortgage, by the recording statutes is of
vital concern to him and also to parties dealing with the mortgagor
without actual notice of the mortgagee's interest. In viewing the
pertinent statutes there exists some doubt as to whether recording
will constitute constructive notice. As it is presently worded the
"personalty" clause found in Section 254 of the Real Property Law
makes no mention of personalty which will feed the mortgage after
execution and recordation. 47  Speaking only of presently acquired
chattels, and being the only statute in the Real Property Law cover-
ing the recording of this dual-natured mortgage, it would seem that,
despite recording, purchasers or chattel mortgagees of the mortgagor,
without actual notice, should not be charged with this imputed no-
tice. In few cases has this problem been directly involved, but finance
companies, in negotiating with mortgagor-owners, and intending to
use their after-acquired personal property as additional security, have
experienced difficulties in determining when and how to conduct a
thorough title search.48
Various methods of circumventing the statute have been sug-
gested, e.g., so wording the clause that all personalty will be deemed
a part of the realty; or a part of security.49 But statutory clarifica-
tion, by way of modification and amendment, is essential to complete
understanding and assurance, for there is no guarantee that the courts
will give these suggestions greater effect than the clauses currently
in use.
6 See Note, 175 A. L. R. 401, 423 (1948).4 7 Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Peck-Schwartz Realty Corp. et aL., 277 N. Y.
283, 286, 14 N. E. 2d 70, 71 (1938). Section 254 treats of the construction
of clauses and covenants in rj6rtgages and bonds, and includes the presently
acquired personal property clause as set forth above.4sTersely stated, need ,he prior mortgagee also file his mortgage as a
chattel mortgage, under Section 230 of the Lien Law, since it effects per-
sonalty not presently attached to the premises?
49Friedman, mcpra note 7, at 352.
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The Effect of Various "Exclusionary" Statutory Provisions Upon
the After-acquired Clause
Statutes 50 changing the common law rule, under which the re-
tention of title by a conditional seller (or purchase-money chattel
mortgagee) was paramount to any subsequent purchaser, lienor, or
mortgagee who had relied upon possession by the conditional-vendee
as indicating ownership,51 have not affected the efficacy of such reser-
vation by the vendor-owner in opposition to a prior realty mor-
gagee's after-acquired clause. Since the filing statutes are prospec-
tive in nature and intended to protect only subsequent purchasers
for value without notice, ". . . the inference is that the legislature
meant the common law rule to apply to such a case." 52 Under the
common law in New York, a subsequent conditional vendor without
filing took precedence over a prior mortgagee of the real estate.5 s
The case of Herold v. Cohrone Boat Company 5 mirrors a present
day affirmation of this view while distinguishing situations where
such view will not control. The issue before the court was whether
or not the personal property clause was superior to a subsequent
chattel mortgage. The court, answering in the affirmative, reasoned:
"Defendant [chattel mortgagee] ... relies chiefly upon cases which
concern contests between a real property mortgagee with such an
after-acquired personal property clause and vendors of personal prop-
erty under conditional sales agreements. He misapprehends the
basic distinction between the powers of a possessor of personal prop-
erty without title, holding the same under a conditional sales agree-
ment, and the powers of the possessor of subsequently acquired per-
sonal property with title thereto. . . .In one instance, as here, the
mortgagor has or acquires title to certain personal property which
he can subject to the lien of a real property mortgage with an after-
acquired personal property clause, while in the other, the mortgagor
does not have title and, therefore, the real property mortgage with
the after-acquired personal property clause which he executes is in-
effectual to create a lien on such personal property, the title to which
he has not acquired." " Professor Whitney, discussing these filing
provisions, asserts: "The conclusion that prior realty mortgages were
not intended by the Legislature to be protected as against any unfiled
50 Sections 65 and 67 of the New York Personal Property Law render con-
ditional sales contracts, unless properly filed or recorded, depending upon
whether the property in question is personalty as a matter of law or a fix-
ture as determined by the "removable" nature of the property annexed, void
both against subsequent bona fide purchasers for value from the conditional
vendee and against attachment or lien creditors without notice.51 VoLD, LAW OF SALES § 97 (1931).52
rWmTEY, LAW OF SALES 80 (4th ed. 1947).
53 Ibd.
54 249 App. Div. 318, 292 N. Y. Supp. 81 (2d Dep't 1936).55 Herold v. Cohrone Boat Company et al., 249 App. Div. 318, 319-320,
292 N. Y. Supp. 81, 83-84 (2d Dep't 1936).
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conditional sale contract is strengthened by considering the probable
effect of the words 'before such purchase (mortgage)' found towards
the end of the second sentence of Section 67 referring to the time
before which the conditional sale contract must be filed. If these
words mean 'before the mortgage is executed and delivered,' they
obviously cannot refer to a prior mortgage, for it would be impossible
for a subsequent conditional vendor to file his contract before the
antecedent mortgage was made.
6
Thus, in New York, a prior real property mortgage with a now
or hereafter acquired personal property clause does not incorporate
property sold by the conditional vendor notwithstanding his failure
to file.
Conclusion
No greater single stride in the right direction has been made
than that of the Court of Appeals in the Bonac case. By adopting
this common-sense approach to the problem, rather than stringently
adhering to the "rules" of fixtures or annexation, the court has given
effect to the obvious intent of the parties. It is submitted that the
continued use of such a criterion and the drafting of clearer record-
ing provisions, so as to give sufficient notice to subsequent interested
parties, will turn what was considered a nebulous and arbitrary seg-
ment of the law into a straightforward and understandable one.
M
UNAUTHOlUZED APPEARANcE
The State of New York is committed to an anomalous rule of
law by which the unauthorized acts of a responsible attorney at law
may bind an unserved resident by a judgment rendered by a court
of record. The rule is such that-in its extreme application-a sol-
vent attorney at law finding a summons on the street and entering
a general appearance for the defendant named therein could bind him
to a final judgment although the party had never seen the summons,
had never known of the action, and had never authorized the attorney
to act.
Denton v. Noyes,1 decided by the Court of Appeals in 1810,
established this rule in New York. In that case, the defendants were
A and B, acceptors, and C, drawer, of three several drafts. C, being
unable to comply with the terms demanded by the plaintiff's attorney,
offered other terms. The attorney agreed to discuss the counter offer
with the plaintiff only if some attorney of the court would stipulate
rs WHrrNEy, op. cit. supra note 52, at 81.
16 Johns. 296 (N. Y. 1810).
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